인도에게 이제 선택을 강요할 수 없다(NYT)

우크라이나 전쟁 초기에 인도에 대한 미국이 보였던 강경한 태도는 더 이상 볼 수 없게 되었다. 전쟁이 4개월 째로 접어 드는 상황에서 국제적 힘의 균형이 바뀌어 가고 있음을 명확하게 목도한다. 우크라이나 침공은 푸틴의 광기로 벌어진 의미없는 도발이며, 서구와 자유진영의 협력으로 러시아는 그 불장난에 대한 댓가를 치루게 될 것이라는 러시아 두드리기 일색의 자유진영의 언론사의 보도는 전쟁이 100일을 지나며 이미 그 내용을 달리하고 있다. 러시아는 시간이 걸리고 있지만, 우크라이나 돈바스 지역을 완전히 장악하는 등 가시적인 성과를 보이고 있다는 사실을 받아들이고 있으며, 기사화하고 있다. 그리고 점차 러시아의 군사력 이외의 또 다른 강력한 무기, 러시아가 보유한 에너지자원과 식량자원은 비서구권 국가들을 러시아의 편으로 끌어들이는데에, 최소한 반러시아 전선에 참여하지 못하게 하는데에 결정적인 역할을 하고 있다. 특히 에너지자원에 있어 많은 인구과 제조업의 영향으로 30퍼센트 가량 저렴한 러시아의 천연가스와 석유가 절대적으로 필요한 인도에 있어 러시아와의 단절은 국가 경제의 실리적인 면에서 그야 말로 악몽과 같다. 전쟁이 길어져 갈 수록 인도의 이런 입장은 뚜렸해 지고 있으며, 타국가가 보아도 인도의 선택에 반대할 명분이 없어진 것이다. 이 것이 미국의 바이든 대통령이 우크라이나 전쟁 초기와 지금, 인도의 러시아 에너지 자원 수입 대해 바뀐 입장 차이의 이유를 설명한다. 흥미로운 것은 러시아의 재정상황이 서구의 각종 경제제제에도 불구하고 여전히 건재하다는 것인데, 가장 주요한 이유는 역시 천연가스와 석유의 수출이다. 국제 가격이 연일 최고가인 현 상황에서 주요 수출국인 러시아의 수입이 늘고 재정이 안정화 되었다. 아래 글에 보면  전쟁 후 100일 동안 에너지자원을 유럽에 팔아서 벌어들인 이익은 전체의 75퍼센트이며, 인도의 경우에는 5퍼센트 밖에 되지 않는다는 인도측의 쓴소리를 볼 수 있다. 인도 입장에서는 전쟁을 일으킨 러시아를 적극적으로 옹호할 수는 없지만, 전쟁이 벌어지며 앞마당의 안보위협을 느끼는 유럽에서 러시아에 대부분의 전쟁자금을 공급하고 있는 상황에서 한 나라이긴 하지만 인구와 산업을 대비해 유럽보다 더 수요가 많을 수 있는 인도에 수입해라 하지마라 하는 것이 어의가 없는 상황일 수 있다. 그럼에도 이전 같았으면, 영국의 식민지였던 18,19세기는 말 할 것도 없고, 소련이 붕괴하고 미국과 유럽의 힘이 최정점에 이르렀던 2010년 이전 같았으면 인도에 수입하지 말라는 으름장을 계속 놓을 수 있을 지 모른다. 하지만, 안타깝게도 인도가 더 이상은 그들의 말을 고분고분하게 듣는 동생이 아니다. 정서적인 민족적인 동질감도 전혀 공유하지 못하는 서구권에 대해, 더군다나 러시아 침공에 대해서 현재까지 선전전 이외에는 무력하기 그지 없는 나토의 대응이 말하는 국제 헤게모니의 이동이 인도의 러시아산 에너지 수입의 선택에 주요한 변수가 되었음을 주지한다. 아래글에서 바이든이 상황을 인정하듯 자기 입으로 말한 것처럼, 인도는 더 이상 어떤 편도 굴종적으로 선택할 필요가 없게 되었다. 

원문 https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/28/world/asia/india-russia-war.html

In Russia Crisis, India Tries to Balance Geopolitics and Economics

 

In Russia Crisis, India Tries to Balance Geopolitics and Economics - The New York Times

www.nytimes.com

 

By Emily Schmall and Suhasini Raj

June 28, 2022

When Russia first invaded Ukraine, the United States warned India against buying more Russian oil, saying that New Delhi could face “consequences.” Now the West is softening its stance, emphasizing that India doesn’t need to choose sides.

The changing tone reflects the middle path that India is carving out for itself in thiscrisis, as the nation tries to maximize its geopolitical leverage without limiting its economic opportunities. At the summit this week for the Group of 7 leaders, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, who was invited to attend, made pacts on climate action and development with the West while ignoring its entreaties to help isolate Russia.

India is also trying to position itself as the voice of poorer nations, arguing that sanctions hurt developing countries the most. It has defended its increasing purchases of Russian crude as a necessity at a time of rising inflation.

 

“All of you will also agree with this, that energy access should not be the privilege of the rich only — a poor family also has the same rights on energy,” said Mr. Modi at a G7 session. “And today, when energy costs are sky-high due to geopolitical tensions, it is more important to remember this thing.”

While the United States wants to intensify the global pressure against Russia, it also can’t risk alienating allies like India. It needs India as a counterweight on other issues, particularly the American strategy to contain China.

Ahead of the G7 summit, John Kirby, the U.S. National Security Council coordinator, described India as a “key strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific Region.” He said that the United States does not want to “coax them away” from Russia.

At the summit, President Joe Biden announced a $600 billion international infrastructure fund meant as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a big-money push by Beijing to create diplomatic ties around the world. India, Mr. Biden said, would be among the first beneficiaries.

“The kind of architecture the U.S. is trying to build in the Asia Pacific, it wouldn’t stand on the same legs without India in it,” said Pratyush Rao, a director at Control Risks, a consultancy that focuses on business and political risk. “I think India feels it can push the boundaries as long as that element still stays in the picture.”

 

Oil is at the heart of India’s balancing act.

In March, U.S. officials, including Mr. Biden, urged India to not increase energy purchases from Russia. India ignored them, doubling its imports. India bought about 76 million barrels of Russian crude in four months, at a 30 percent discount to the global benchmark price. Indian officials have repeatedly defended these purchases as a means to blunt the impact of higher food and fuel prices for the majority-poor population.

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“We’re yet to recover from a pandemic,” said India’s petroleum minister, Hardeep Singh Puri, noting that the country is “still feeding” hundreds of millions of people and subsidizing vaccines.

“We have to look after our own interests,” he added.

It’s an important financial calculus for many nations. As the United States and Europe contemplate their next rounds of sanctions to isolate Russia, there is growing concern that the fallout is fueling an alarming hunger problem and energy crisis that will not easily be reversed.

Other South Asian nations have taken the same approach as India, remaining neutral but also trying to take advantage of cheap Russian oil. As its energy supplies run out, Sri Lanka is sending two ministers to Russia to negotiate.

 

“The ministers are going to Russia to try to source oil directly from the government,” Keheliya Rambukwella, Sri Lanka’s minister of health, said to The New York Times.

“We are trying everything to meet the demands” of residents, he added.

The West is starting to recognize that sanctions have done serious damage globally, without significantly crimping the Kremlin's war machine. Energy prices have skyrocketed, helping to prop up Russia’s oil revenues. The United States is now pushing for a price cap on Russian oil as it looks for new ways to punish Moscow.

India has repeatedly called out the hypocrisy of the West’s demand on oil while Europe continues to fuel its own economies with Russian natural gas. European countries continue to receive the majority of their natural gas through pipelines from Russia.

In the first 100 days of the war, about three-quarters of Russia’s revenues from fossil fuels came from Europe, according to the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air. Less than 5 percent came from India.

“Buying Russian gas is not funding the war?” Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister, said at a forum in Slovakia earlier this month. “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.”

In many ways, Mr. Modi is maintaining India’s traditional position of strategic autonomy.

India’s ties to Russia date to its independence, when few other nations recognized New Delhi’s currency or creditworthiness. Over the years, Russia has backed India at the United Nations on questions over the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir.

It is also India’s largest arms supplier. After a visit with Mr. Modi in April, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, said the two countries were looking at ways to expand trade.

With threats on both of its borders, India has resisted calls from Western countries to join them in condemning the Russian invasion. Mr. Modi has maintained a neutral stance on the war, calling during the G7 summit for a resolution through diplomacy and dialogue.

At the same time, India’s prime minister is breaking from the past by showing less reticence to be part of overtly Western-led alliances, such as the Quad security grouping that includes the United States, Australia and Japan. As India’s largest market, the United States is also key to Mr. Modi’s ambitions to expand India’s economy by 8 to 9 percent annually.

“It’s like chess,” said Amitabh Mattoo, a former adviser to India’s National Security Council and a professor of international studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. “Everyone is finding it tough to anticipate the move of the other.”

“Now let us see whether Jaishankar and Modi can play the middle game of this fascinating game of geopolitical chess in the manner of a grandmaster,” he added, “or will they falter?”